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Abstract 
This paper re-examines the incentives of mutual fund managers arising from investor flows. We 
provide evidence that the convexity of the flow-performance relationship varies with economic 
activity. We show that the effect is economically large and is not driven by abnormal years. We test 
two possible channels through which this pattern may arise. We investigate implications of the time-
varying convexity for the incentives of managers to alter strategically the risk of their portfolios. We 
provide evidence that poor mid-year performers increase the risk of the portfolio only when economic 
activity is strong. Finally, we briefly discuss some methodological implications.  
 
 
JEL Classification codes: G11, G23 
 
Key words: Mutual funds, Incentives, Flow-Performance Relationship, Convexity, Business Cycles 
                                                 
* We thank but do not incriminate Laurent Calvet, Francesco Franzoni, Ulrich Hege, Hao Jiang, Christophe Pérignon, Tarun 
Ramodorai, Olivier Scaillet, Bruno Solnik, Melvin Teo, Mitch Warachka and participants of the June 2008 Adam Smith 
Asset Pricing Conference and of the HEC brownbag seminar for invaluable comments. We gratefully acknowledge 
generous financial support by the Fondation HEC (first author) and the SMU (second author).  We thank Fred Yanqing Goh 
for excellent research assistance. 
 1
INTRODUCTION 
 
The mutual fund industry has grown remarkably over the past two decades. According to the 
Investment Company Institute1, net cash flows into equity mutual funds have increased by a factor of 
twenty to one between 1985 and 2005, while gross inflows and outflows have both increased by factors 
larger than thirty to one. Academic research into mutual fund issues has likewise grown considerably 
over the same period. One topic that has attracted a lot of attention is the sensitivity of cash flows from 
investors to fund performance. Since the seminal work by Ippolito (1992), a large and active literature2 
has confirmed the existence of a convex relationship between flows and past performance: investors 
seem to react strongly to differences in performance among the top performing funds in the industry, 
but do not react to differences in performance among underperforming funds. This behavior is 
consistent with rational behavior and competitive equilibrium, as demonstrated by Berk and Green 
(2004), and the empirical evidence has been found to be robust across different definitions of flows and 
performance, and across many different sets of control variables.  
 
The convexity of the flow-performance relationship is important because it shapes the incentives of 
mutual fund managers. Fees raised by mutual funds, and therefore the compensation of mutual fund 
managers, are proportional to the average net assets held during the year. As first pointed out by 
Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and by Chevalier and Ellison (1997), the nature of the fee structure, 
the convexity of the flow-performance relationship, and the assessment of performance on a calendar 
year basis, together imply that mutual fund managers with poor mid-year performances have incentives 
to increase the risk of their portfolio during the second half of the year. By raising risk, managers of 
underperforming funds would catch up with stronger performers if successful, but have little to lose if 
not. This has been called the tournament hypothesis.  
 
The central result of this paper is that the convexity of the flow-performance relationship, and 
therefore the incentives it provides to fund managers, vary sharply over time. As found by previous 
researchers, the flow-performance relationship is convex on average. However, we find that convexity 
is most pronounced when economic activity is strong, while flows can even become a concave function 
of past performance during recessions. We show that the effect is economically large as even small 
                                                 
1 As cited by Cashman et al. (2007). 
2 See e.g. Gruber (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Del Guercio 
and Tkac (2002), Lynch and Musto (2003), Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005), Gallaher, Kaniel and Starks (2006) and 
Huang, Wei and Yan (2007) 
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fluctuations of economic activity alter the shape of the flow-performance relationship in a significant 
fashion. We show that the effect is not driven by exceptional years, whether strong booms or deep 
recessions. We also show that fund managers react to these fluctuations in a way that is consistent with 
the tournament hypothesis. Finally, we contend that our result carries some methodological 
implications.  
 
The fact that economic activity changes the shape of the flow-performance relationship should not 
come as a surprise. First, we know that aggregate flows into mutual funds are strongly correlated with 
economic activity3: because of consumption smoothing, agents invest money into mutual funds when 
the economy is booming and divest when economic activity is slowing down. We also know that gross 
outflows are less sensitive to past performance than are gross inflows4. This likely is because investors 
hold concentrated portfolios of risky assets and are forced to liquidate their holdings, regardless of  
performance, whenever they need to finance consumption5. As outflows constitute a larger fraction of 
total flows when economic activity is weak than when it is strong, the flow-performance relationship 
becomes flatter throughout when economic growth slows down. If in addition some investors suffer 
from a disposition effect, whereby they hold on past losers while liquidating past winners6 then 
investor flows may even become a weakly decreasing and concave function of past performance during 
recessions, as we observe in our data. 
 
An alternative channel through which economic activity can affect the flow-performance 
relationship is volatility7. It is well-known that stock market volatility is countercyclical8. It is 
therefore reasonable to expect that any fixed level of performance by a mutual fund manager contains 
more "noise" during a recession than during a boom. If the flow-performance relationship is at least 
partially driven by investors trying to infer the skill of the mutual fund manager as a function of the 
manager’s past performance, we should again expect flows to be less responsive to strong past 
performance when economic activity is weak than when it is strong. 
                                                 
3 See e.g. Kosowski (2006) 
4 See evidence in Tables IV and V of Cashman et al. (2007) 
5 The fact that investors typically invest in very few assets has been known at least since Blume and Friend (1975). More 
recently, Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2007) present new evidence from a detailed database at the individual investor level 
which includes mutual fund holdings. They note that most investors do indeed hold very few assets in their risky portfolio 
but show that this does not necessarily result in significant under-diversification of the portfolio thanks to mutual fund 
holdings.  
6 For the seminal paper on prospect theory which provides theoretical grounding for the disposition effect, see Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979). For application and evidence to the stock market, see Shefrin and Statman (1985) or Odean (1998) 
7 We are grateful to Laurent Calvet for pointing out this alternative hypothesis to us. 
8 See e.g. Schwert (1989a and b), Hamilton and Lin (1996) or Mele (2007) 
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 Our analysis is based on actively managed US domestic equity funds appearing in the CRSP 
database between 1980 and 2006. We obtain three closely related sets of results. First, we investigate 
the impact of economic activity, as measured by US GDP growth, on the shape of the flow-
performance relationship. We consider six specifications corresponding to six different measures of 
performance. In all specifications, GDP growth is found to have a statistically significant impact on the 
flow-performance relationship. The impact of economic activity on the convexity of the flow-
performance relationship is strongest when performance is measured by a year-by-year ordinal ranking 
of fund managers, as in Sirri and Tufano (1998) or in Huang, Wei and Yan (2007). Our point estimates 
suggest that the flow-performance relationship no longer exhibits any convexity as soon as GDP 
growth falls by 1% below its sample mean. Conversely, a GDP growth rate 1% above its sample mean 
implies a flow-performance relationship twice as convex as that found at the sample mean of GDP. In 
other words, we find that even moderate fluctuations in economic activity have a significant impact on 
the nature of incentives faced by mutual fund managers. In line with this point estimate, we provide 
direct evidence showing that none of our results are driven by "abnormal years" corresponding to either 
deep recessions or strong booms. 
 
 Next, we evaluate the two possible channels through which economic activity may affect the flow-
performance relationship: composition of aggregate flows and stock market volatility. In all 
specifications, we find strong evidence that years where aggregate flows into the mutual fund industry 
are large (and therefore gross outflows are small relative to gross inflows) are years with the strongest 
convexity in the flow-performance relationship. Although we find some evidence that higher stock 
market volatility leads to a lower sensitivity of flows to performance, we also find that stock market 
volatility does not explain the pattern of convexity of the flow-performance relationship across the 
business cycle.  
 
Our final set of results verify whether time variation in the shape of the flow-performance 
relationship directly translates into time variation in risk-shifting by underperforming managers, as 
predicted by the tournament hypothesis. We call conditional tournament hypothesis the prediction that 
poor mid-year performers increase the risk of their portfolio only when economic activity is strong. As 
in Koski and Pontiff (1999), we consider three different measures of risk: total risk, idiosyncratic risk 
and systematic risk. We regress the change in risk exposure of the fund between the second and first 
halves of the year on mid-year performance and on an interaction variable equal to the product of GDP 
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growth and mid-year performance. We find the strongest evidence in favor of the conditional 
tournament hypothesis when looking at the impact of mid-year performance on idiosyncratic risk. 
Regardless of the specification adopted, the coefficient of the interaction variable is statistically 
significant. In addition, point estimates of the regression suggest effects that are economically 
significant. For instance, in the case of a mild boom (GDP growth 1% above its sample mean), the 
change in risk exposure when going from bottom to top performer corresponds to around 30% to 40% 
of the risk of the average performer in our sample. Results of regressions where risk is measured by 
total risk are also consistent with the conditional tournament hypothesis. However, the effects are of 
smaller economic magnitude. The weakest results of all are obtained when looking at the impact of 
performance on systematic risk. This should however not come as a surprise as the reason why 
managers of underperforming funds may wish to change their risk exposure is so as to generate 
"spurious" alphas by the end of the year, which can only be achieved by changing idiosyncratic risk 
and not by changing the betas of their portfolios. Overall, our results suggest that choices of risk by 
fund managers are indeed consistent with the incentives provided to them by the (time-varying) 
convexity of the flow-performance relationship. 
 
This paper is quite closely related to work by Kosowski (2006) who studies the evolution of mutual 
fund performance and fund flows across the business cycle. Kosowski shows that the performance of 
mutual funds is negative on average but becomes positive during recessions. He also shows that 
aggregate flows are significantly larger during booms than during recessions9. Our focus here is 
different as we show that the flow-performance relationship is convex on average but may become 
concave during a recession, which is not implied by any of Kosowski's findings. We also show that the 
effect of economic activity on the shape of the flow-performance relationship arises under normal 
economic conditions, and is driven neither by deep recessions not by strong booms. Nonetheless, our 
results in the second half of the paper may cast a new light on Kosowski's results. Our results indicate 
that the divergence of the objectives of fund managers (who care about net flows) from the objectives 
of investors (who care about performance) is an increasing function of economic activity. A natural 
conjecture to make is that the distortion of incentives faced by fund managers may be partly 
                                                 
9 Given the result in Cashman et al. (2007) that inflows are more sensitive to performance than outflows, Kosowski's 
findings also imply that investors display more of a performance-chasing behaviour during booms than during recessions. 
This has been recently pointed out by Cederburg (2008) who investigates implications on the smart money effect. 
 5
responsible for the underperformance of mutual funds during expansion phases documented by 
Kosowski10. 
 
Our paper is also closely related to the empirical literature on the tournament hypothesis, which has 
so far obtained only mixed evidence. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Koski and Pontiff (1999) 
initially provided evidence generally supportive of the tournament hypothesis. Khorana (1996) does 
not find any conclusive evidence that underperforming managers take additional risk in the hope of 
offsetting accrued losses. Using contingency tables, Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) find evidence 
supporting the tournament hypothesis but report conflicting results across sub-samples. Busse (2001) 
discusses methodological issues concerning the interpretation of contingency tables, and finds that 
results regarding the tournament hypothesis are very sensitive to the sample period chosen, the 
frequency of returns used to compute measures of risk, and the method used to compute standard 
errors. Goriaev, Nijman and Werker (2005) complement methodological issues raised by Busse. They 
also report that, depending in the sample period, the evidence in their sample as often supports the 
tournament hypothesis as it does the opposite result, namely, that poor half-year performers decrease 
the level of risk of their portfolio relative to that of strong half-year performers. Qiu (2003) reports 
similar evidence and suggest that it may be due to agency problems within mutual funds.  
 
The joint evidence we report of time-varying convexity in the flow-performance relationship and of 
matching time-variation in the risk-shifting behavior of fund managers provides a unified explanation 
to the seemingly contradictory findings of the existing literature, which does not rely on unobserved 
agency problems within mutual funds. Our solution to the "tournament puzzle" is related to that 
provided in a recent working paper by Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2007) who find that risk-shifting by 
mutual fund managers is correlated with market returns. There are however significant differences 
between their work and ours. Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele argue that the correlation they find is due to 
the differential cost for a mutual fund manager to be fired under bad rather than good market 
conditions.11 However, they do not estimate this differential cost nor do they compare it with the high-
powered incentives typically provided in the compensation package of mutual fund managers. In 
contrast, we provide direct and new evidence of time variation in the incentives of fund managers 
arising from the convexity of investor flows rather than from career concerns of managers. We provide 
                                                 
10 This conjecture is reinforced by recent findings by Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2008) who show that risk shifting by mutual 
fund managers is detrimental to performance. 
11 See Hu et al (2007) for another resolution of the tournament puzzle based on employment risk of fund managers. 
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quantitative estimates of this effect and show that it is large enough to alter incentives of mutual fund 
managers in a significant fashion. We then relate the risk-shifting of fund managers in the second half 
of our paper to the incentives we identified in the first half. 
 
Finally, the central result of our paper carries some methodological implications. The methodology 
most frequently used in the existing literature on the flow-performance relationship, Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) regressions, assumes that slope coefficients of all single-year regressions are drawn from the 
same distribution. In this paper, we provide direct evidence that the slope parameter, i.e. the sensitivity 
of flows to past performance, actually varies at business cycle frequencies. Using the Fama-MacBeth 
methodology when the slope coefficient is time-varying can lead to severely misleading conclusions, as 
first pointed out in the asset pricing literature on the conditional CAPM12. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in Section I, we describe the data, the variables, 
and the methodology we use in our analysis. In Section II, we report evidence on the time-varying 
nature of the flow-performance relationship and investigate the different channels through which 
economic activity may affect this relationship. Section III is devoted to the analysis of the conditional 
tournament hypothesis. Section IV concludes. 
 
 
I) Data and Empirical Methodology 
 
A) Data source 
 
We use mutual funds that appear in the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database 
between 1980 and 2006. As with most papers in the literature, we focus on US domestic equity mutual 
funds, and exclude fixed income funds, international equity funds and balanced funds, as well as any 
fund for which the proportion of stocks in the portfolio never exceeds 80%. As in Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2002), we exclude funds with front loads. We do this not only for the reason given by 
Pastor and Stambaugh (namely that it is not clear how to treat load fees in a single period setting) but 
mostly because of results obtained by Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) which show that front loads 
have a stronger impact on the flow-performance relationship than any other fees. They also show that 
                                                 
12 See e.g. Harvey (1989) and Jagannathan and Wang (1996) 
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there have been substantial changes both in the proportion of funds with front loads (from over 90% in 
the 1940's to less than 40% in the 90's) and in the way investors react to front loads with investors 
learning to avoid funds with higher front-end loads. As our objective is to identify time-variation in the 
flow-performance relationship due to the business cycle, we want to eliminate as much as possible any 
other source of time variation in our sample, thus our choice to focus on no-load funds. Further 
restrictions of the sample follow commonly adopted procedures in the literature since Chevalier and 
Ellison (1997): we exclude funds closed to investors, index funds, funds of funds, very small funds 
(conservatively defined as funds that never reached $10M of total net assets during their existence), 
and multiple share classes. We exclude funds with rear loads strictly larger than 1%. Finally, for 
regressions that require estimating factor loadings, we require the fund to have more than 2 full years 
of return history. We are left with a sample of 942 funds for regressions based on excess returns, and 
865 funds for regressions requiring the estimation of factor loadings. For each fund, we select the 
largest contiguous sample period for which we have no missing observations for TNA or returns, and 
during which the fund did not acquire the assets of a delisted fund, as indicated by the merge_icdi 
series in CRSP. This leaves us with a total of 6146 observations for the regressions based on excess 
returns, and 4342 observations for regressions requiring the estimation of factor loadings.  
 
Apart from mutual fund data, we require the risk-free rate, returns on the equally weighted market 
portfolio, Fama and French (1993) SMB and HML factors, and Carhart's (1997) momentum factor, 
which we obtained from the CRSP Mutual Fund Monthly Returns and Fama-French Factors file. We 
construct monthly volatility using daily equal weighted returns, including distributions, obtained from 
the CRSP indices file. Finally, data on Real GDP is from the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and was downloaded via the FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) website.  
 
B) The Variables 
 
 Our empirical analysis consists in two types of regressions. In Section II, we run regressions of 
flows on past performances, and control variables. In Section III, we regress changes in risk exposure 
on past performances. We construct data on flows using data on Total Net Assets ( ) and returns 
. As in Goetzmann and Peles (1997) and Lynch and Musto (2003), we focus on annual dollar flows 
( ) defined as: 
,i tTNA
,i tr
,i tFLOW
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1,,,, )1( −+−= titititi TNArTNAFLOW  
 
Although several authors in the literature focus on percentage flows, obtained by dividing dollar 
flows by the previous year’s TNA, we choose not to do so for two reasons. First, from a statistical 
standpoint, it is well-known that percentage flows contain many extreme outliers generally associated 
with small or new funds. Small changes to the procedure used to trim the sample or to winsorize the 
data seem to have large effects on the outcome of the regressions. Second, from an economic 
standpoint, we care about flows only to the extent that flows contribute to fees collected by the mutual 
fund and to the compensation package of the fund manager. Given the fee structure of mutual funds, 
where fees are a constant fraction of total net assets, we believe that dollar flows provide a better proxy 
for the true determinants of a fund manager's compensation package than do percentage flows. Put 
differently, it is unlikely that all other things being equal, a fund manager's compensation is a sharply 
decreasing function of the fund's initial size, as would be the case if compensation was indexed on 
percentage flows.  
 
Numerous different measures of performance have been used in the literature on the flow-
performance relationship. In this paper, we use the three most commonly used measures, namely: 
(i) Excess returns, defined as the return of the fund minus the return of the market portfolio 
(ii) One factor alpha (CAPM), where the fund's beta has been estimated using the past 24 months of 
return data. 
(iii) Four factor alpha, where the four factors are as proposed by Carhart (1997), namely the return 
on the market portfolio, the SMB and HML factors of Fama and French (1993), and a momentum 
factor, and where factor loadings of the fund have again been estimated using the past 24 months of 
return data. 
 
These measures can be used directly, as in Gruber (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Lynch and 
Musto (2003), Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005), among others. Alternatively, these measures can be 
used to rank funds within each year, and the ranks13 used as a measure of performance, as in Sirri and 
Tufano (1998), and Huang, Wei and Yan (2007), among others. We use both types of measures of 
performance in the paper, using the terminology "absolute performance" to refer to the first type and 
"relative performance" or "rank" to refer to the second type. We therefore have six different measures 
                                                 
13 The ranks within each year are normalized to lie between 0 and 1. 
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of performance, three of which are measures of absolute performance and three of which are measures 
of relative performance. 
 
We use two types of control variables: we use cross-sectional variables of funds' characteristics that 
have been found by the existing literature to have an impact on flows from investors. We also use time-
series variables, which we interact with performance variables so as to capture and interpret time-
variation in the sensitivity of investor flows to past performance. Cross-sectional variables include 
expenses expressed in percentage, the age of the fund in years, and the fund's initial relative size, which 
is defined as , where the sum in year , 1 , 1/i t i i tTNA TNA− Σ − 1t −  is computed over all the funds that are in 
our sample in that year. Time series variables include real GDP growth, average flow, and annual 
market volatility. Real GDP growth is computed as 100 times the difference of the log of annual GDP 
measured in billions of chained 2000 dollars. Average flow tAFLOW  is the year by year average dollar 
flow, that is  
 
.(1/ )t t i i tAFLOW n FLOW= Σ   
 
where  is the number of funds in our sample in year t . For annual market volatility tn ,M tσ , we use 
realized volatility calculated as  
 
2
, , ,M t rM t ττσ = ∑   
 
where , ,M tr τ  is daily returns in year t , with distributions, of an equal weighted portfolio of stocks listed 
on NYSE/AMEX. Table I includes summary statistics about the flow, performance, control, and 
interaction variables.  
 
 
[INSERT TABLE I AROUND HERE] 
 
 
Our final set of variables are risk exposure variables. We follow Koski and Pontiff (1999) and focus 
on three measures: 
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(i) Total risk, defined as the standard deviation of the fund's monthly returns minus the monthly 
risk-free rate 
(ii) Idiosyncratic risk, measured by the standard deviation of the residuals of a market model 
regression ran on monthly returns. 
(iii) Systematic risk, measured by the estimated beta coefficient of a market model regression ran 
on monthly returns. 
 
These risk exposure variables are used in the regressions in Section III. In particular, the dependent 
variable in these regressions will be the difference between the standard deviation of the fund's risk 
variable (total, idiosyncratic, or systematic) during the July to December period and the standard 
deviation of the risk variable during the January to June period. This implies that each standard 
deviation in that difference is estimated from only six data points and thus contains a fair amount of 
noise. A natural solution to this problem is to use daily instead of monthly returns to estimate risk. 
Busse (2001) and Goriaev, Nijman and Werker (2005) discuss this issue thoroughly and show that the 
presence of autocorrelation in daily returns makes the choice between daily and monthly returns non-
trivial. However, Goriaev, Nijman and Werker conclude that "tests of the tournament hypothesis based 
on monthly data are more robust to autocorrelation effects than tests based on daily data". This 
motivates our choice. 
 
C) Estimation Technique 
 
As far as the flow-performance relationship is concerned, the most common procedure followed by 
the existing literature is to use Fama-MacBeth regressions. This would however be inappropriate for 
our purposes, for two reasons. First, Fama-MacBeth regressions consist in running separate regressions 
for each year and to treat differences in estimated slopes across different years in the sample as noise, 
based on which standard errors are computed. Our objective is to show that the true value of the slopes 
is time-varying and is driven by business cycle variables, which makes Fama-MacBeth impossible to 
use. In addition, it is unlikely that our set of control variables is sufficient to capture all of the effects of 
fixed funds' characteristics on investor flows, which require us to adjust the computation of standard 
errors beyond that suggested by Fama and MacBeth. 
 
We run an unbalanced panel, allowing for time fixed effects via a full set of year dummy variables 
(whose coefficients are unreported in the tables). Including time dummies captures any deterministic 
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time trend in the flow variable. However, time dummies cannot capture stochastic trends, i.e., trends 
driven by unit roots. If there are stochastic trends in the flow variable, results we obtain given our 
current specification may be spurious. To address this issue, we run panel unit root tests on , 
using both the common unit root tests of Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) and the individual unit root tests 
of Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003). In both tests, we reject the presence of unit roots, thus validating our 
specification.  
,i tFLOW
 
In addition to the year dummy variables, we control for fund-specific effects by using standard 
errors clustered by funds. As a robustness check, we ran the same regressions using White standard 
errors and obtained t-statistics quite substantially larger than the ones obtained with fund clustering. As 
pointed out by Petersen (2008), the difference in t-statistics between the two methods is strongly 
suggestive of fund specific effects left unexplained by the control variables. As a consequence, all p-
values reported in the paper are based on the more conservative cluster standard errors. We use the 
same methodology of unbalanced panel data analysis with time fixed effects and clustering of standard 
errors by funds for the tournament regressions in Section III, for which we know from the analysis of 
Busse (2001) and Goriaev, Nijman and Werker (2005) that correlation of standard errors is a serious 
problem.  
 
II) The Time-Varying Convexity of the Flow-Performance Relationship 
 
A) Identifying the business cycle effect 
 
Our primary objective in this section is to show that the sensitivity of investor flows to past 
performance changes in a systematic way along the business cycle. We first establish the facts and 
explore their robustness to various definitions of performance. We then investigate possible 
explanations of this phenomenon.   
 
Our main results regarding the flow-performance relationship are in Tables II and III. Table II uses 
measures of relative performance while Table III uses measures of absolute performance. In each table, 
regressions (1), (3) and (5) show the standard flow-performance relationship as identified by the 
existing literature, with performance (either relative or absolute) measured by excess returns, 1-factor 
alpha and 4-factor alphas respectively. Regressions (2), (4) and (6) measure the time-varying flow-
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performance relationship, with the sensitivity of flows to past performance allowed to vary with the 
business cycle. Regressions (2), (4) and (6) are similar to regressions (1), (3) and (5) except that 
regressions (2), (4) and (6) contain an additional interaction variable, constructed as the product of 
performance with deviations of GDP growth from its sample mean. The advantage of testing for the 
impact of economic activity using an interaction variable rather than simply splitting the sample 
between, say NBER recession years and other years is that it allows us to detect both effects occurring 
during normal years and effects driven by exceptional years of severe economic slowdown. This 
specification also provides a direct estimate of the magnitude of the impact of economic activity on the 
sensitivity of flows to past performance.   
 
Using the chain rule, we can decompose the total effect of a change in performance on investor 
flows in the following way: 
 
, , ,
,
, 1 , 1 , , 1
( )
(( )* )
i t i t i t
GDP t GDP
i t i t GDP t GDP i t
dFlow Flow Flow
g g
dPerformance Performance g g Performance− − −
∂ ∂= + −∂ ∂ −            (1)  
 
The interpretation of (1) is straightforward. The coefficients in multivariate regressions are 
interpretable as partial derivatives. The first term in the RHS of (1) is equal to the coefficient of 
performance in a regression of flows on past performance and other control variables. Similarly, the 
partial derivative in the second term of the RHS is given by the coefficient on the interaction variable 
previously defined. Under average economic activity, that is, when the growth rate of GDP is equal to 
its sample mean, the second term in the RHS of (1) is equal to 0. In that case, the total effect of past 
performance on flows is just given by the partial derivative of flows on performance. This implies that 
one can interpret the coefficient of flows on past performance as the sensitivity of flows to performance 
under average economic activity. On the other hand, when economic activity is strong (resp. weak), 
that is when the growth rate of GDP is larger (resp. lower) than its sample mean, the total effect of past 
performance on flows is equal to the partial derivative of flows on past performance plus a term of the 
same sign (resp. of the opposite sign) as the coefficient of flows on the interaction variable. This allows 
us to make the following statement which underlies the interpretation of all regressions in this section: 
 
The sensitivity of flows to past performance is an increasing function of economic activity if and 
only if the coefficient on the interaction variable is positive 
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 A standard feature of flow-performance regressions is that they separate out observations with 
"good" performance and observations with "bad" performance and allow the sensitivity of flows to past 
performance to differ depending on whether the past performance falls in the "good" or in the "bad" 
category. Defining the thresholds of regions of "good" vs. "bad" performance is in many ways an ad-
hoc decision left to the econometrician. In the existing literature, papers that use relative performance 
use either three or five different quintiles while papers using absolute performance often divide 
performance into only two regions corresponding to positive vs. negative returns14. We follow the 
procedure used in the existing literature and use different partitions for relative and absolute 
performances even though it implies that results in our Tables II and III are not immediately 
comparable to one another. 
 
More specifically, we follow the same procedure as Sirri and Tufano (1998) for Table II and 
partition relative performance into three unbalanced quintiles. We allow the sensitivity of flows to past 
performance (rank) to depend on whether the fund’s performance in the past year ranked in the bottom 
quintile, the top quintile, or in between. In other words, the relationship between flow and past rank 
takes the form of a piecewise linear function. As in Sirri and Tufano (1998), we restrict this piecewise 
linear relationship to be continuous. Technically, this is achieved by defining: 
  
, 1 , 1min( ,0.2)
BOTTOM
i t i tRank Rank− −≡  
, 1 , 1 , 1min( ,0.6)
MIDDLE BOTTOM
i t i t i tRank Rank Rank− − −≡ −  
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1min( ,0.2)
TOP BOTTOM MIDDLE
i t i t i t i tRank Rank Rank Rank− − − −≡ − −  
 
where , 1i tRank −  refers to the rank of fund  in year i 1t − , and running the regression: 
 
, 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 (time dummies) (controls)
TOP MIDDLE BOTTOM
i t i t i t i tFLOW a Rank a Rank a Rank− − −= + + + +  
 
                                                 
14 Other specifications include using a semi-parametric approach as in Chevalier and Ellison (1997) or adding the square of 
performance as an additional independent variable as in Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005). 
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The coefficient measures the sensitivity of flows to past good performance, and  measures the 
sensitivity of flows to past bad performance. This is the specification of regressions (1), (3), and (5) in 
Table II.  
1a 3a
 
To allow , , and  to change with the level of economic activity, we adopt the following 
specification, used in regressions (2), (4) and (6) in Table II: 
1a 2a 3a
 
, 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1
4 , 1 , 5 , 1 , 6 , 1 ,( ) ( ) ( )
(time dummies) (controls)
TOP MIDDLE BOTTOM
i t i t i t i t
TOP MIDDLE BOTTOM
i t GDP t GDP i t GDP t GDP i t GDP t GDP
FLOW a Rank a Rank a Rank
a Rank g g a Rank g g a Rank g g
− − −
− − −
= + +
+ − + − +
+ +
−  
 
For the absolute return regressions in Table III, we follow the same procedure as Lynch and Musto 
(2003) and others, and simply partition (absolute) performance into two regions. A fund i  is allocated 
to the positive (resp. negative) region during year t  if its absolute performance in year t  is positive 
(resp. negative), in which case the dummy variable 
1−
,i tδ +  (resp. ,i tδ − ) takes value 1 for that fund and that 
year. This yields the following specifications:  
 
For regressions (1), (3) and (5) in Table III: 
, 1 , 1 , 1 2 , 1 , 1* * (time dummies) (controls)i t i t i t i t i tFLOW a Performance a Performanceδ δ+ −− − − −= + + +  
 
For regressions (2), (4) and (6) in Table III:  
, 1 , 1 , 1 2 , 1 , 1
3 , 1 , 1 , 4 , 1 , 1 ,
* *
* ( ) * (
(time dummies) (controls)
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t GDP t GDP i t i t GDP t GDP
FLOW a Performance a Performance
a Performance g g a Performance g g
δ δ
δ δ
+ −
− − − −
+ −
− − − −
= +
+ − +
+ +
)−  
 
As in the existing literature, we say that the flow-performance relationship exhibits convexity if and 
only if flows are more sensitive to good than to bad performances. Given the partitions of performance 
defined above, we obtain convexity for regressions (1), (3) and (5) in Table II if and only if the 
coefficient on the variable , 1
TOP
i tRank −  is strictly larger than the coefficient on the variable . 
Similarly, we obtain convexity for regressions (1), (3) and (5) in Table III if and only if the coefficient 
on the variable 
, 1
BOTTOM
i tRank −
, 1 , 1*i t i tPerformance δ +− −  is strictly larger than the coefficient on the variable 
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, 1 , 1*i t i tPerformance δ −− − . For all the specifications, we perform a one-sided t-test of the sign of the 
difference of the two coefficients and report the result in the tables immediately below coefficients of 
performance variables.    
  
We can perform with convexity the same decomposition analysis as we did with the sensitivity to 
performance. Convexity of the flow-performance relationship can be decomposed into convexity under 
average economic activity, which obtains when the coefficient of performance in the good region is 
strictly larger than the coefficient of performance in the bad region, and the impact of economic 
activity on convexity. Using equation (1) and the same reasoning as previously, we get that: 
 
With relative performance, convexity of the flow-performance relationship is an increasing function of 
economic activity if and only if the coefficient of ,(  - )*
TOP
GDP t GDP i t, 1g g Rank −  is strictly larger than the 
coefficient of , ,(  - )*
BOTTOM
GDP t GDP i tg g Rank −1 . 
 
 
With absolute performance, convexity of the flow-performance relationship is an increasing function of 
economic activity if and only if the coefficient of , 1 , , 1* (  - )*i t GDP t GDP i tPerformance g g δ +− −   is strictly 
larger than the coefficient of , 1 , , 1* (  - )*i t GDP t GDP i tPerformance g g δ −− − . 
 
In either case, the result of the corresponding one-sided t-test is included in the tables immediately 
below the coefficients of the interaction variables. 
 
 
[INSERT TABLE II AROUND HERE] 
 
 
Looking at the results of Table II, we first observe that fund characteristics explain investor flows 
in the usual way: larger and younger funds attract more dollar flows. As found by Barber, Odean and 
Zheng (2005), expenses do not seem to play a huge role once we exclude front loads. We also see that 
the sensitivity of flows to past performance fits the pattern that has been observed by the existing 
literature: regardless of whether the ranking of funds is done on the basis of excess returns, 1-factor 
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alpha or 4-factor alphas, we find that investor flows react positively and significantly to relative 
performance if the fund belongs to the top or to the middle quintile but do not react to relative 
performance if the fund belongs to the bottom quintile. As a consequence, tests of convexity under 
average economic activity yield p-values around 0.01 to 0.02 if funds are ranked according to excess 
returns or 1-factor alpha, and p-values around 0.05 to 0.06 if funds are ranked according to 4-factor 
alphas. 
 
However, the most important result in Table II concerns the impact of economic activity, measured 
by GDP growth, on the sensitivity of flows to performance and on the convexity of the flow-
performance relationship. Observing the coefficient , we observe that investor flows react more to 
performance of funds in the top quintile during years with strong economic activity. The effect is 
statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence when the ranking of funds is done according to 
excess returns and 1-factor alphas. It is also economically significant. If one compares the respective 
size of the coefficients  and , one observes that the sizes are almost identical. Using equation (1) 
and recalling that 
4a
1a 4a
,( GDP t GDPg g− )  is expressed in percentage, we can conclude that a +1% change in 
GDP growth induces a sensitivity of flows to performance in the top quintile which is twice as large as 
the average sensitivity of flows to performance. Similarly, a -1% change in GDP growth implies that 
investor flows become completely insensitive to performance. As the standard deviation of GDP 
growth in our sample is equal to 1.7%, our point estimates imply that even small fluctuations of 
economic activity can have a large impact on the sensitivity of flows to performance. 
 
The same conclusion can be reached when looking at the impact of economic activity on the 
convexity of the flow-performance relationship. We find a strong statistical impact, with p-values 
ranging from 1.4% to 5.2%. We also find strong economic significance with again a +1% or -1% 
change in GDP growth implying, respectively, either twice as much convexity as the average convexity 
in the sample, or no convexity at all. 
 
Results in Table III, using absolute returns instead of relative returns, are somewhat weaker. When 
performance is based on 1-factor alphas (regressions 3 and 4), results are qualitatively similar to results 
in Table II: the flow-performance relationship exhibits convexity on average and the impact of GDP on 
convexity is both statistically and economically significant. When performance is computed with 
excess returns or with 4-factor alphas, we still get a significant positive effect of GDP growth on the 
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sensitivity of flows to performance at the 5% level of confidence. We also get point estimates 
suggesting that faster GDP growth leads to more convexity. However, the effect on convexity is no 
longer statistically significant. 
 
 
[INSERT TABLE III AROUND HERE] 
 
 
One possible explanation for the relatively weaker results for absolute returns is the coarser 
partition of performance regions used in Table III and the fact that flows into funds in the 3rd-5th 
decile are more sensitive to performance than flows into funds in the bottom two deciles. Other 
explanations are provided in the next two subsections, where we investigate the nature of the business 
cycle effect in more detail. 
 
 
B) Sources of the business cycle effect 
 
Before understanding why economic activity may have an impact on the convexity of the flow-
performance relationship, we need to understand why convexity arises in the first place. The key 
premise is that investors look for funds delivering positive alphas. We know from the recent literature 
that, once one properly accounts for the luck factor, at best only a small fraction of mutual funds 
deliver positive alphas15. Thus, it is optimal for investors to invest primarily only in the very best 
performers in the industry. Berk and Green (2004) have demonstrated that performance chasing 
behaviour of investors and a convex flow-performance relationship may arise as the outcome of a 
competitive equilibrium model even if mutual fund performance is not persistent, as suggested by the 
empirical literature. 
 
While this argument applies to both new investment flows and portfolio rebalancing flows, it is 
unlikely to apply for outflows. Indeed, we observe empirically that investors invest only in very few 
assets16. As a consequence, investors are forced to liquidate whichever asset they invested into, 
regardless of its performance, whenever they need to finance consumption. In fact, evidence to that 
                                                 
15 See Barras, Scaillet and Wermers (2007), and Kosowski et al. (2006) 
16 See e.g. Blume and Friend (1975), or Calvet, Campbell and Soldini (2007) for more recent evidence. 
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effect is provided in Tables IV and V of Cashman et al. (2007) where it appears that outflows are much 
less sensitive to performance than inflows. The relationship between outflows and performance could 
even go in a counter-intuitive way if at least some investors suffer from a disposition effect whereby 
they hold on past losers and liquidate past winners, as has been demonstrated for the stock market by 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) and by Odean (1998). If the disposition effect is strong enough, investor 
flows become a weakly decreasing and concave function of past performance. 
 
In our dataset, we observe neither inflows nor outflows but net flows which is the sum of the two. 
If inflows are a convex function of performance but outflows are not, net flows will themselves be a 
convex function of performance if the relative weight of inflows relative to outflows is large enough. 
Because of consumption smoothing, it is natural to expect that the relative proportion of inflows vs. 
outflows to be correlated with economic activity. Evidence in that direction has already been provided 
by Kosowski (2006) and the result holds in our dataset as well. This provides a first possible channel 
through which economic activity may affect the convexity of the flow-performance relationship: 
stronger economic activity implies relatively more inflows than outflows.17
 
An alternative explanation starts from the well-known observation that stock market volatility is 
countercyclical18. High volatility increases the "luck factor" in the realized performance of fund 
managers and thereby complicates the inference process of investors. As the inference process becomes 
more noisy, we should again expect flows to be less responsive to past performance when economic 
activity is weak than when it is strong. 
 
In order to disentangle these two effects, we run a "horse race" between the flow composition effect 
and the countercyclical volatility effect. Instead of interacting past performance with GDP growth, we 
interact it instead with average flows for year t , tAFLOW , and with lagged annual stock market 
volatility19 , 1M tσ − . That is, we run a regression of investor flows into individual funds on to: (i) fund 
characteristics, (ii) past performance, (iii) interaction variable between past performance and average 
flows, (iv) interaction variable between past performance and average flows of the year into all mutual 
                                                 
17 A possible reinforcing factor, but which we cannot test independently, is the evidence provided by Kumar (2008) which 
suggests that investors are more likely to suffer from disposition effects during recessions than during times with strong 
economic activity. 
18 See e.g. Schwert (1989a and b), Hamilton and Lin (1996) or Mele (2007) 
19 Volatility is lagged as it is volatility at period 1t −  that affects investor’s ability to interpret a fund’s performance over 
period . 1t −
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funds. In order to make the coefficient on the interaction variables easier to interpret, we normalize our 
measures of average flows and of stock market volatility to variables with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1. Results of the regressions are presented in Tables IV and V. 
 
 
[INSERT TABLES IV AND V AROUND HERE] 
 
 
The most striking feature of the regressions in Tables IV and V is the strong support they provide to 
the average flow channel. For all six specifications, we find that the sensitivity of investor flows to past 
performance is a sharply increasing function of tAFLOW  for funds in the top performance region. 
Looking for instance at the first regression in Table IV and comparing the relative size of coefficients 
 and , we find that a one standard deviation increase of 1a 4a tAFLOW  leads to a slope which is three 
times as steep as under average market conditions. This effect is statistically significant in all six 
specifications. In contrast, tAFLOW  has no discernable impact on the sensitivity of flows to 
performance for funds in the middle or bottom performance regions. Thus, an increase of tAFLOW  
always implies a stronger convexity of the flow-performance relationship. Looking at the results in 
Table IV, we find that the effect is always statistically significant at the 5% level and that it is 
economically significant as well: a one standard deviation increase in tAFLOW  leads to a flow-
performance relationship which is three times more convex than under average normal conditions. 
 
Looking now at Table V, we see that the same results supporting the conditional tournament 
hypothesis and the flow composition channel carry through with absolute returns. This is in contrast 
with results we obtained in the previous sub-section where the evidence in favour of a business cycle 
effect on the flow-performance relationship was weaker with absolute than with relative returns. An 
explanation for this finding is provided by the coefficients of the interaction variable between 
performance and stock market volatility. We find that, when significant, higher stock market volatility 
implies a lower sensitivity of flows to performance. However, we also find that this effect never affects 
the top performance region. That is, higher stock market volatility never leads to less convexity. On the 
contrary, when stock market volatility is high, that is during recessions, investors tend to "forgive" fund 
managers who obtained disastrous absolute performance, while the same performance in an 
environment with low stock market volatility would cause investor outflows. This effect goes in the 
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opposite direction from the flow composition channel, thus leading to the more ambiguous overall 
effect of GDP growth on convexity for the absolute return case. 
 
To confirm this insight, and since the effect of high stock market volatility is likely to be 
concentrated in a few abnormal years, we now investigate whether the business cycle effect arises as an 
outcome of normal economic conditions or whether it is driven by a few outliers corresponding to 
either deep recessions or strong booms. 
 
C) Normal fluctuations of economic activity vs. extreme fluctuations 
 
Our last robustness checks consist in verifying whether our results carry through in a sample where 
we remove all years which experienced large economic fluctuations, either downward (recessions) or 
upwards (strong booms). The objective is to investigate the extent to which our findings are driven by 
outliers corresponding to exceptional years or whether they arise under normal economic conditions. 
Mean GDP growth in our sample is equal to 2.9%. Standard deviation is equal to 1.7%. We use 
somewhat arbitrarily chosen cut-offs for our reduced sample of deviations of GDP growth around the 
sample mean equal to plus or minus 2%. In other words, we retain in our reduced sample all years 
during which GDP growth lies in the interval [+0.9%, +4.9%]. This requirement excludes 5 of the 27 
years initially in our sample, namely 1980, 1982, 1984, 1991 and 2001. We then test the effect of GDP 
growth on convexity in our reduced sample and report the results in Tables VI and VII 
 
 
[INSERT TABLES VI AND VII AROUND HERE] 
 
 
Comparing results obtained for the reduced sample in Tables VI and VII with results obtained for 
the full sample in Tables II and III yields unambiguous results. The impact of GDP growth on the 
sensitivity of flows to performance in the top performance region is much larger in the reduced sample, 
even by a factor of 3 to 5 in the case of absolute returns. As a consequence, the impact of GDP growth 
on convexity is stronger in the reduced sample than in the full sample. We find strong statistical 
support for the hypothesis that convexity of the flow-performance relationship is positively correlated 
with economic activity in all specifications, including the case of absolute returns, for which p-values 
are all below 0.03.  
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 These findings show that economic activity has an impact on the shape of the flow-performance 
relationship above and beyond any effect driven by "abnormal" years with strong negative or positive 
growth. As such, they complement and reinforce conclusions reached by Kosowski (2006) on the 
impact of real activity on performance and flows using NBER recessions. Comparing these results with 
the full sample results suggests that the relationship which associates investor flows to relative 
performance is more stable than the relationship which associates investor flows to absolute 
performance. This is because investors seem to interpret absolute performance differently in years with 
strong economic fluctuations and/or high stock market volatility than they do under normal conditions. 
Finally, our finding that small variations of economic activity cause significant variation in the 
sensitivity of flows to past performance contradicts the assumptions of the methodology most 
frequently used in the existing literature on the flow-performance relationship, namely Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) regressions, which requires slope coefficients of all single-year regressions to be drawn from the 
same distribution. Using the Fama-MacBeth methodology when the slope coefficient is time-varying 
can lead to misleading conclusions, as first pointed out in the asset pricing literature on the conditional 
CAPM. 
 
Summarizing the results in Section II, we find that: 
 
(i) Convexity of the flow-performance relationship varies with economic activity. 
 
(ii) The effect of economic activity on convexity is economically significant: a +1% change in GDP 
growth implies a flow-performance relationship which twice as convex as on average 
 
(iii) The effect of economic activity on convexity is driven by a flow composition effect: the stronger 
the economic activity, the more inflows relative to outflows, and the more sensitive net flows are to 
(good) performance.    
 
(iv) The effect of economic activity on convexity arises under normal economic conditions and is not 
driven by years with extreme fluctuations. 
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III) Application: Solving the Tournament Puzzle 
 
A) Conditional vs. Unconditional Tournament Hypothesis 
 
Having established that the shape of the flow-performance relationship varies with economic 
activity, we now turn to its implications for the incentives of fund managers. The fact that a convex 
flow-performance relationship may induce fund managers who underperform during the first part of the 
year to increase the risk of their portfolio has been well-known since the seminal papers of Brown, 
Harlow and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997). The model underlying this conjecture is 
both simple and appealing given institutional characteristics of the mutual fund industry. We know that 
the fee structure in the mutual fund industry is such that fees received by funds are maximized when 
net flows and total net assets are maximized. We also know that the evidence strongly suggests that 
investor flows are a weakly increasing function of performance with a flat section in the region of 
worse performance, which makes them like payoffs of a tournament. A simple computation implies 
that increasing risk for funds currently in the region where flows are insensitive to performance is a 
"free gamble": either performance falls even deeper in the region of worse performance, but this affects 
neither flows nor fees, or performance jumps up sufficiently to enter the region with positive slope, in 
which case both flows and fees go up. 
 
As discussed in the introduction, however, recent empirical evidence has been less supportive of 
this conjecture than earlier results. Busse (2001) challenges the methodology used by Brown, Harlow 
and Starks (1996) and argues that their results are very sensitive to the sample period, the frequency of 
returns used to compute measures of risk, and the method used to compute standard errors. Goriaev, 
Nijman and Werker (2005) complement the methodological issues raised by Busse. In addition, they 
report results suggesting that, if anything, the evidence over the 1976-2001 period points half as often 
in the direction of the tournament hypothesis as it does in the direction of the opposite result, namely 
that poor half-year performers decrease the level of risk of their portfolio relative to that of strong half-
year performers. Similar results in the latter direction are provided by Qiu (2003), Hu et al (2007), and 
Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2007). 
 
How to explain the apparent lack of robustness of tests of the tournament hypothesis? Two answers 
are provided in the existing literature. The answer provided by Busse (2001) and Goriaev, Nijman and 
Werker (2005) is that tests based on observed returns are simply not powerful enough given the noise 
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in estimating the risk exposure of mutual fund managers within a year. They suggest to turn instead 
toward tests based on the actual composition of the fund portfolios, which is however not readily 
available. The other answer is provided by Qiu (2003) and Hu et al (2007) who argue that the argument 
underlined above ignores the possibility that a fund manager is fired as a consequence of poor 
performance. As Chevalier and Ellison (1999) suggests that the probability of being fired for a fund 
manager is itself a convex function of past performance, the overall payoff function of the fund 
manager need not be convex even if the manager's compensation package is based on flows that are a 
convex function of past performance. This implies that the theoretical prediction of the tournament 
hypothesis is ambiguous. 
 
Our view in this paper is more optimistic. We use the results we obtained in the previous section 
showing that incentives provided by the tournament structure of flows changes with the level of 
economic activity in a significant fashion. When economic activity is strong, there is strong convexity 
of the flow-performance relationship, thus the difference between the "prize" available to "winners" of 
the tournament and the payoff of the "losers" is large, and the incentives for "underdogs" to increase 
the risk of their portfolio in the middle of the tournament are strong. In contrast, when economic 
activity is weak, the prize for winning the tournament is small and incentives for poor mid-year 
performers to undertake risk-shifting are much less. In fact, point estimates of the flow-performance 
regressions in the previous section suggest that the flow-performance relationship becomes concave 
when economic activity slows down enough, which would actually reverse the incentives provided to 
managers of funds with poor mid-year performance. In other words, the time-varying nature of the 
flow-performance relationship implies that the appropriate tournament hypothesis to test is that poor 
mid-year performers should increase the risk of their portfolio if and only if economic activity is 
strong. We call this hypothesis the conditional tournament hypothesis, in contrast with the 
(unconditional) tournament hypothesis tested by the existing literature which implies that poor mid-
year performers should always increase the risk of their portfolio. 
 
Three remarks need to be made about the conditional tournament hypothesis: 
 
(i) It does not solely constitute a way to justify why tests of the unconditional tournament 
hypothesis may fail or may give different results across sub-samples. It also provides strong testable 
implications about when the tournament hypothesis will hold and when it will not: the change in risk 
by poor mid-year performers should be positively and significantly correlated with economic activity. 
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 (ii) The conditional hypothesis does not suffer from the same problem of theoretical ambiguity as 
the unconditional hypothesis, as it is unlikely that the cost for a manager to be fired is lower in a 
recession than in an expansion phase. A similar point is made by Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2007) 
who assume that the cost of a manager being fired is a decreasing function of market returns and use 
that assumption to derive a conjecture similar to our conditional tournament hypothesis. 
 
(iii) A recent paper by Cvitannic, Lazrak and Wang (2007) provides a different motive for poor 
mid-year performers to increase the risk of their portfolio. Cvitannic, Lazrak and Wang show that this 
feature naturally arises in an intertemporal optimization setting where managers try to maximize the 
Sharpe ratio of their portfolios. As a consequence, even if tests of the unconditional tournament 
hypothesis were positive, they would not be able to distinguish the incentives-based motive of Brown, 
Harley and Stark (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) from the intertemporal optimization motive 
of Cvitannic, Lazrak and Wang (2007). In contrast, a positive result to a test of the conditional 
tournament hypothesis provides strong support to the incentives motive. 
 
B) Empirical Evidence 
 
Empirical evidence regarding the conditional tournament hypothesis is provided in Tables VIII to 
XIII. Each table corresponds to one of the six different specifications of measurement of performance 
we used in Section II. Within each table, results of six regressions are provided. Regressions (1), (3) 
and (5) are similar to regressions in Koski and Pontiff (1999) for respectively, total risk, idiosyncratic 
risk and systematic risk as defined in Section I. In each case, the dependent variable, ,i tRiskΔ  is defined 
as the difference between the risk of fund i  during the period July-December of year t  and the risk of 
fund  during the period January-June of year . We then regress i t ,i tRiskΔ  on the performance of fund 
 during the January-June period of year  (mid-year performance) using unbalanced panel data 
techniques allowing for fixed year effects through a full set of year dummy variables and using 
standard errors clustered by funds to allow for fund-specific effects. 
i t
 
Regressions (2), (4) and (6) augment the set of independent variables to allow for economic activity 
to interact with past performance, and thus test the conditional tournament hypothesis. Regressions (2), 
 25
(4) and (6) can be interpreted the same way as we interpreted the time-varying flow-performance 
relationship regressions. Using the chain rule, we have: 
 
, , ,
,
, 1 , 1 , , 1
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
(( )* )
i t i t i t
GDP t GDP
i t i t GDP t GDP i t
d Risk Risk Risk
g g
dPerformance Performance g g Performance− − −
Δ ∂ Δ ∂ Δ= + −∂ ∂ −        (2) 
 
As in Section II, the first term in the RHS of (1) is equal to the coefficient of mid-year performance. 
Similarly, the partial derivative in the second term of the RHS is provided by the coefficient on the 
interaction variable between GDP growth and mid-year performance. We can again interpret the 
coefficient of mid-year performance as the sensitivity of ,i tRiskΔ  to mid-year performance under 
average economic activity. The prediction of the unconditional tournament hypothesis is that this 
coefficient should be negative: the lowest the mid-year performance, the more the fund manager should 
increase the risk of his portfolio.  
 
However, when the economic activity is strong (resp. weak), that is when the growth rate of GDP is 
larger (resp. lower) than its sample mean, the total effect of mid-year performance on ,i tRiskΔ  is not 
just equal to the partial derivative of ,i tRiskΔ  on mid-year performance, but it is equal to that partial 
derivative plus a term of the same sign (resp. of the opposite sign) as the coefficient of ,i tRiskΔ  on the 
interaction variable. The conditional tournament hypothesis says that the total effect of mid-year 
performance on ,i tRiskΔ  should be negative if and only if economic activity is strong enough. This 
property holds if and only if the coefficient on the interaction variable is negative. We thus get: 
 
The unconditional tournament hypothesis is satisfied if and only if the coefficient on mid-year 
performance is negative 
 
The conditional tournament hypothesis is satisfied if and only if the coefficient on the interaction 
variable is negative 
 
 
[INSERT TABLES VIII TO XIII AROUND HERE] 
 
 26
 Turning to the results, we first find that, as in the existing literature, support for the unconditional 
tournament hypothesis is pretty weak. Depending on the way we measure performance and the type of 
risk we consider, all four possible results for the coefficient of mid-year performance (positive 
significant, positive insignificant, negative insignificant, negative significant) can be obtained. 
 
In contrast, results regarding the conditional tournament hypothesis are strong and unambiguous 
across all six measures of performance. The strongest results are obtained for the case of idiosyncratic 
risk, that is, for regressions (4) in the tables. From a statistical standpoint, we observe that the 
coefficient of the interaction variable between GDP growth and mid-year performance is always of the 
right sign (negative) and significant at the 0.01 level of confidence. From an economic standpoint, an 
easy assessment of the magnitude of the effects we observe is available in the case of relative 
performance, that is for Tables VIII to X. Remember that relative performance is by construction 
always between 0 and 1, with 0 corresponding to the worse performer and 1 to the best performer. 
Remember also that GDP growth is expressed in percentage. The coefficients of the interaction 
variable in Regressions (4) in Tables VIII to X then imply that the impact of a 1% increase in GDP 
growth is a difference in terms of (monthly) idiosyncratic risk between bottom and top performers 
equal going from 0.73% to 0.95%. To put these numbers in perspectives, we can compare them to the 
average level of idiosyncratic risk for funds in our sample, which is slightly above 2%. Our point 
estimates thus imply that during a mild expansion, the bottom performer in our sample shifts the level 
of idiosyncratic risk in his portfolio relative to that of the top performer by a factor between 1.3 and 
1.4, which is not huge but is nevertheless economically significant20. 
 
Results regarding the conditional tournament hypothesis for total risk (Regressions 2) are still fairly 
strong in terms of statistical significance: the interaction variable is always of the right sign, it is 
significant at the 0.01 level of confidence in three out of six specifications of the measure of 
performance, and it is significant at the 0.05 level of confidence in all specifications. Economic 
significance is however more modest than for idiosyncratic risk: doing similar computations as above 
yields that during a mild expansion, the bottom performer in our sample shifts the level of total risk in 
his portfolio relative to that of the top performer by a factor between 1.07 and 1.25. 
 
                                                 
20 These numbers are comparable to those obtained by Chevalier and Ellison (1997) 
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Given the decomposition of total risk in between systematic and idiosyncratic risk and given the 
results above, it should come as no surprise that our weakest results hold for systematic risk. Actually, 
if one looks at statistical significance only, the conditional tournament hypothesis seems to hold for 
systematic risk as well: the coefficient of the interaction variable is again negative and significant in 5 
out 6 specifications. However, performing the same test of economic significance as above reveals that 
the effect of mid-year performance on the change in beta by fund managers is trivial in terms of 
magnitude. For instance, point estimates of regression (6) in Table VI suggest that the bottom 
performer increases the beta of his portfolio relative to that of the top performer by an amount equal to 
0.07. 
 
To summarize our results, we find strong statistical support for the conditional tournament 
hypothesis in all specifications of the tournament regressions. In terms of economic significance, the 
strongest effect is found when looking at idiosyncratic risk. This should not come as a surprise. The 
reason why managers of poorly performing funds want to increase the risk of their portfolio is in the 
hope of being lucky and to generate "spurious alphas", so as to fool investors into believing that the 
manager possesses high skill. This can only be done by raising idiosyncratic risk. Thus, to get back to 
the issue that initially motivated the literature on the tournament hypothesis, our results suggest that 
mutual fund managers do respond to incentives provided to them by the (time-varying) convexity of 
the flow-performance relationship. 
 
 
IV Concluding Remarks  
 
In the past few years, there has been formidable growth in the literature on investor flows in the 
mutual fund industry, and on the tournament hypothesis. We believe that this paper provides an 
important link that bridges many of the results in the existing literature that have so far remained 
unconnected. This missing link is the fact that the convexity of the flow-performance relationship 
varies strongly with economic activity. Our point estimates suggest that a plus or minus 1% variation in 
GDP growth entails respectively, twice as much convexity as average, or no convexity whatsoever. Our 
finding provides a quantitatively plausible solution to different issues in the mutual fund literature such 
as:   
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(i) Why there is significant time variation in the extent of risk-shifting by mutual fund managers, as in 
Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) 
 
(ii) Why mutual funds seem to deliver worse performance during booms than during recessions, as in 
Kosowski (2006) 
 
(iii) How different qualitative properties of gross inflows and gross outflows, as identified by Cashman 
et al. (2007), affect fund managers decisions 
 
More generally, our results point toward a complex interaction between real activity and incentives 
of market participants. Asset pricing theory has long recognized that time-varying risk premia and 
shocks to risk aversion are central for our understanding of asset prices. In a very modest way, this 
paper provides a very specific channel through which shocks to economic activity translate into shocks 
to the risk appetite of agents. As economic activity intensifies, mutual fund managers see their 
incentives biased toward more risk taking, which is qualitatively consistent with the long established 
stylized fact that risk premia are countercyclical21. We leave it to future research to discover if this 
channel, or channels like it, can contribute quantitatively to our understanding of time-varying risk 
premia. 
                                                 
21 See e.g. Ferson and Harvey (1991) and references in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). 
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Table I Summary Statistics 
 
This table contains summary statistics of the flow, performance, and control variables. FLOW
, , , , 1(1 )i t i t i t i tFLOW TNA r TNA
 is defined as: 
 −= − +
,i tTNA
t
 
where  represents the total net assets of fund i at the end of year t (in M$) and where ri,t is the net return of fund i during year t. Performance is 
measured either by excess return ri,t-1 - rm,t-1 , where rm is the return on the equally weighted market portfolio, or by residuals of a CAPM equation (1-factor 
alpha) or of a Carhart (1997) model (4-factor alpha), where factor loadings have been estimated from 24 monthly observations. Size and expenses are 
expressed in percentage, where Size is defined by TNAi,t-1 / Σj (TNAj,t-1). Real GDP growth is computed as 100 times the difference of the log of annual 
GDP measured in billions of chained 2000 dollars. Average flow AFLOW .(1 / )t t i i t is the year by year average dollar flows, that is AFLOW n FLOW= Σ
tn t ,
 
where  is the number of funds in our sample in year . For annual market volatility M tσ , we use realized volatility calculated as 2, , ,M t M tr ττσ = ∑
, ,
 
where 
 
   
 Mean S.D 
   
   
Flow ($mil) 21.12 287.47 
Performance   
Excess Returns -0.071 0.196 
One-Factor Alphas -0.034 0.171 
Four-Factor Alphas -0.036 0.136 
   
Size (%) 0.408 1.816 
Age (years) 7.862 5.778 
Expenses (%) 1.218 0.512 
Real GDP Growth 2.900 1.769 
Average Net Flow ($mil) 35.21 54.71 
Realized Volatility 0.148 0.054 
   
M tr τ  is daily returns in year , with distributions, of an equal weighted portfolio of stocks listed on NYSE/AMEX.   t
Table II: Flow-Performance Relationship: the relative performance case 
This table examines the evolution over the business cycle of the impact of relative fund performance (i.e. Rank) in year t-1 on the net flow of the fund in year t. For each regression, the dependent variable, 
,i tFLOW  is defined as: , 1(1 ), , ,i t i t i t i tFLOW TNA r TNA= − + , where  represents the total net assets of fund i at the end of year t (in M$) and where r− ,i tTNA i,t is the net return of fund i during year t. Each year, funds 
are ranked between 0 (poorest performer) and 1 (best performer) based on their previous year performance, where performance is either measured by excess return ri,t-1 - rm,t-1 , where rm is the return on the equally 
weighted market portfolio, or by residuals of a CAPM equation (1-factor alpha) or of a Carhart (1997) model (4-factor alpha), where factor loadings have been estimated from 24 monthly observations. The 
variables , 1
TOP
i tRank − ,  , 1
MIDDLE
i tRank − , and , 1
BOTTOM
i tRank − , are defined as , , and , 
where 
, 1 , 1min( ,0.2)
BOTTOM
i t i tRank Rank− −= , 1 , 1 , 1min( ,0.6)MIDDLE BOTTOMi t i t i tRank Rank Rank− − −= − , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1min( ,0.2)TOP BOTTOM MIDDLEi t i t i t i tRank Rank Rank Rank− − − −= − −
, 1i tRank −  refers to the rank of fund i in year t-1. The variable ,(  - )  measures deviations in percentage of the US real GDP growth rate from its sample mean. Size and expenses are expressed in 
percentage, where Size is defined by TNA
GDP t GDPg g
i,t-1 / Σj (TNAj,t-1). Regressions also include one dummy variable for each year in the sample (coefficients unreported).  The sample is composed of 942 no-load US equity 
mutual funds appearing in the CRSP database between 1980 and 2006, where we exclude index funds, multiple share classes, funds closed to investors, funds of funds and funds with TNA < 10M$ for their entire 
existence. For regressions where the dependent variable is 1-factor or 4-factor alpha, we require funds to have at least 2 years of full return history, which further restricts the sample to 865 funds. Standard errors 
are clustered by funds. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. We report below each triplet of rank variables the difference between 
the coefficient of the top quintile rank variable and that of the corresponding bottom quintile rank variable and the p-value resulting from a one-sided t-test of the sign of that difference predicted by the theory. 
 
Rank based on: Excess returns 1-factor alpha 4-factor alpha 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Size 34.214 (***) 33.868 (***) 21.531 (**) 21.552 (**) 21.017 (**) 21.142 (**) 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.042) (0.039) (0.044) (0.041) 
Age - 5.399 (***) -5.362 (***) - 4.497 (***) -4.367 (***) -4.656 (***) -4.575 (***) 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Expenses -10.356 -11.490 - 0.377 0.520 -6.518 -6.240 
 (0.275) (0.225) (0.968) (0.955) (0.484) (0.507) 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
(a1) :    219.675 279.777 (*) 390.755 (*) 485.497 (*) 332.778 406.660 , 1
TOP
i tRank −
 (0.142) (0.057) (0.079) (0.059) (0.159) (0.141) 
 
(a2) :  , 1
MIDDLE
i tRank −  187.629 (***) 192.182 (***) 202.400 (***) 207.740 (***) 158.819 (***) 164.650 (***) 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(a3) :  , 1
BOTTOM
i tRank −  -82.598 -90.761 -69.403 -73.006 -53.684 -53.709 
 (0.301) (0.282) (0.503) (0.502) (0.568) (0.596) 
 
 a1-a3 302.27 (**) 370.54 (**) 460.16 (**)  558.5 (**) 386.46 (*) 460.37 (*) 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.013) (0.056)    (0.052) 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
(a4) :  , , 1(  - )*
TOP
GDP t GDP i tg g Rank −  352.072 (**) 494.002 (**)  387.524  
 (0.023) (0.049)  (0.127)  
 
(a5) :  , , 1(  - )*
MIDDLE
GDP t GDP i tg g Rank −   26.823 26.860   29.657  
 (0.176) (0.404)  (0.313)  
 
(a6) :  , , 1(  - )*
BOTTOM
GDP t GDP i tg g Rank −  -39.280 - 26.135  -3.639  
 (0.558) (0.779)  (0.967)  
  
 a4-a6 391.35 (**)  520.14 (**)    391.16 (*)   
 (0.014)  (0.032)    (0.052)  
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Table III: Flow-Performance Relationship: the absolute performance case 
This table examines the evolution over the business cycle of the impact of absolute fund performance in year t-1 on the net flow of the fund in year t. For each regression, the dependent variable, ,i tFLOW  is 
defined as: 
 , , , , 1(1 )i t i t i t i tFLOW TNA r TNA −= − +  
where  represents the total net assets of fund i at the end of year t (in M$) and where r,i tTNA i,t is the net return of fund i during year t. Performance is measured either by excess return ri,t-1 - rm,t-1 , where rm is the 
return on the equally weighted market portfolio, or by residuals of a CAPM equation (1-factor alpha) or of a Carhart (1997) model (4-factor alpha), where factor loadings have been estimated from 24 monthly 
observations. , 1i tδ −−  (resp. , 1i tδ +− ) takes value 1 if the past year performance of the fund is negative (resp. positive), and takes value 0 otherwise. ,(  - )g g  measures deviations in percentage of the US real 
GDP growth rate from its sample mean. Size and expenses are expressed in percentage, where Size is defined by TNA
GDP t GDP
i,t-1 / Σj (TNAj,t-1). Regressions also include one dummy variable for each year in the sample 
(coefficients unreported).  The sample is composed of 942 no-load US equity mutual funds appearing in the CRSP database between 1980 and 2006, where we exclude index funds, multiple share classes, funds 
closed to investors, funds of funds and funds with TNA < 10M$ for their entire existence. For regressions where the dependent variable is 1-factor or 4-factor alpha, we require funds to have at least 2 years of 
full return history, which further restricts the sample to 865 funds. Standard errors are clustered by funds. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level. We report below each triplet of rank variables the difference between the coefficient of the top quintile rank variable and that of the corresponding bottom quintile rank variable and the p-value 
resulting from a one-sided t-test of the sign of that difference predicted by the theory. 
 
Performance measured by: Excess returns 1-factor alpha 4-factor alpha 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Size 34.604 (***) 34.199 (***) 20.479 (**) 20.424 (**) 21.145 (**) 21.085 (**) 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.048) (0.044) (0.045) (0.041) 
Age - 5.450 (***) -5.361 (***) - 4.314 (***) -4.189 (***) -4.565 (***) -4.372 (***) 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Expenses -11.215 -11.509  - 4.143 -2.745  -6.747 -7.307 
 (0.243) (0.232)  (0.661) (0.773) (0.474) (0.443) 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
 
(a1) : 1t   335.143 (***) 350.490 (***) 672.063 (***) 678.399 (***) 396.449 (**) 820.647 (**) 1 ,*t iPerformance δ +− −
*t iPerformance δ −− −
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.013) (0.020) 
 
(a2) : 1t   278.621 (***) 295.841 (***) 209.303 (***) 202.747 (**) 417.716 (***) 406.478 (***) 1 ,
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 a1-a2 56.222   54.649  462.76 (**)  475.65 (**)  -21.267 414.17 
 (0.321)  (0.363)  (0.021) (0.041)  (0.555) (0.148) 
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
  
(a3) : 1 , ,   151.110 (**) 309.193 (**) 358.602 (**)  1*(  - )*t GDP t GDP i tδ− −Performance g g +
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.045)  
 
(a4) :  1 , ,   46.694 - 19.190 173.266 (**)  1*(  - )*t GDP t GDP i tPerformance g g δ −− −
 (0.871) (0.793) (0.014)  
  
 a3-a4  104.15  328.38 (*)  185.34   
 (0.175) (0.054)  (0.195)  
 
Table IV: Decomposition of the business cycle effect: the relative performance case 
This table examines how the impact of relative fund performance (i.e. Rank) in year t-1 on the net flow of the fund in year t varies with aggregate flows 
and market volatility of the year. For each regression, the dependent variable, ,i tFLOW  is defined as: , , , , 1(1 )i t i t i t i tFLOW TNA r TNA −= − + , where ,i tTNA  
represents the total net assets of fund i at the end of year t (in M$) and where ri,t is the net return of fund i during year t. Each year, funds are ranked 
between 0 (poorest performer) and 1 (best performer) based on their previous year performance, where performance is either measured by excess return ri,t-
1 - rm,t-1 , where rm is the return on the equally weighted market portfolio, or by residuals of a CAPM equation (1-factor alpha) or of a Carhart (1997) model 
(4-factor alpha), where factor loadings have been estimated from 24 monthly observations. The variables , 1
TOP
i tRank − ,  , 1
MIDDLE
i tRank − , and , 1
BOTTOM
i t−Rank
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1min( ,0.2)
TOP BOTTOM MIDDLE
i t i t i t i tRank Rank Rank Rank− − − −= − −
, are 
defined as , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , and , 
where 
min( ,0.2)BOTTOMi t i tRank Rank− −= , min( ,0.6)MIDDLE BOTTOMi t i t i tRank Rank Rank− − −= −
, 1i tRank −  refers to the rank of fund i in year t-1.  The variable AFLOWt is defined as: 
( )
,1
(1 / ( )) n tt ii tAFLOW n t FLOW== ∑ ,  
where n(t) represents the number of funds in our sample in year t. (* ( ( )) /t t )AFLOW AFLOW E AFLOW AFLOWσ≡ −  measures standardized deviations 
of the average flow in year t from its full sample mean. * ,M tσ similarly measures standardized deviations of the volatility of the equally weighted market 
portfolio from its full sample mean. Size and expenses are expressed in percentage, where Size is defined by TNAi,t-1 / Σj (TNAj,t-1). Regressions also 
include one dummy variable for each year in the sample (coefficients unreported).  The sample is composed of 942 no-load US equity mutual funds 
appearing in the CRSP database between 1980 and 2006, where we exclude index funds, multiple share classes, funds closed to investors, funds of funds 
and funds with TNA < 10M$ for their entire existence. For regressions where the dependent variable is 1-factor or 4-factor alpha, we require funds to have 
at least 2 years of full return history, which further restricts the sample to 865 funds. Standard errors are clustered by funds. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. We report below each triplet of rank variables the difference 
between the coefficient of the top quintile rank variable and that of the corresponding bottom quintile rank variable and the p-value resulting from a one-
sided t-test of the sign of that difference predicted by the theory. 
 
Rank based on: Excess returns 1-factor alpha 4-factor alpha 
 
 
Size 32.424 (***) 20.746 (**) 20.048 (**)
 (0.004) (0.042) (0.043)  
Age - 5.121 (***) -4.308 (***) - 4.453 (***)
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  
Expenses -11.404 -1.334 - 7.495  
 (0.228) (0.886) (0.421)  
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
(a1):   220.524 380.411 (*) 324.377  , 1
 (0.125) (0.067) (0.137)  
TOP
i tRank −
 
(a2): , 1
MIDDLE
i tRank −  187.676 (***) 202.710 (***) 158.805 (***)
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
(a3): , 1
BOTTOM
i tRank −  -81.408 -69.379 -50.526  
 (0.303) (0.501) (0.589)  
 
 a1-a3  301.93 (**) 449.79 (**) 374.9 (*)  
  (0.017) (0.012) (0.051)  
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
(a4): *  615.240 (**) 705.502 (*) 885.312 (**)( )*tAFLOW ,
 (0.015) (0.087) (0.031)  
1
TOP
i tRank −
 
(a5): * ( )*tAFLOW , 1MIDDLEi tRank −  14.434 35.694  -17.063  
 (0.597) (0.392) (0.624)  
 
(a6): * ( )*tAFLOW , 1BOTTOMi tRank −  -69.824 - 61.767 76.557  
 (0.327) (0.559) (0.518)  
  
 a4-a6  685.06 (***)   767.27 (**)  808.76 (**) 
  (0.004)   (0.031)  (0.022) 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
(a7):   *   130.418 125.587 233.131 (*)( )* , 1M tσ − , 1
 (0.197) (0.326) (0.098)  
TOP
i tRank −
 
(a8):   * ( )* , 1M tσ − , 1MIDDLEi tRank −  -58.403 (***) -53.571 (***)  -49.653 (**)
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.012)  
 
(a9):   * ( )* , 1M tσ − , 1BOTTOMi tRank −  9.593 59.096 -12.435  
 (0.876) (0.440) (0.181) 
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Table V: Decomposition of the business cycle effect: the absolute performance case 
This table examines how the impact of absolute fund performance in year t-1 on the net flow of the fund in year t varies with aggregate flows and market 
volatility of the year. For each regression, the dependent variable, FLOW
, , , , 1(1 )i t i t i t i tFLOW TNA r TNA −= − +
TNA
δ − δ +
 is defined as: 
 
where ,i t  represents the total net assets of fund i at the end of year t (in M$) and where ri,t is the net return of fund i during year t. Performance is 
measured either by excess return ri,t-1 - rm,t-1 , where rm is the return on the equally weighted market portfolio, or by residuals of a CAPM equation (1-factor 
alpha) or of a Carhart (1997) model (4-factor alpha), where factor loadings have been estimated from 24 monthly observations. , 1i t−  (resp. , 1i t− ) takes 
value 1 if the past year performance of the fund is negative (resp. positive), and takes value 0 otherwise. AFLOWt is defined as: 
( )
,1(1 / ( ))
n t
t i tiAFLOW n t FLOW== ∑
( )* ( ( )) /t t
, where n(t) represents the number of funds in our sample in year t. 
 AFLOW AFLOW E AFLOW AFLOWσ≡ −
*
 
measures standardized deviations of the average flow in year t from its full sample mean. ,M t similarly measures standardized deviations of the volatility 
of the equally weighted market portfolio from its full sample mean. Size and expenses are expressed in percentage, where Size is defined by TNA
σ
i,t-1 / Σj 
(TNAj,t-1). Regressions also include one dummy variable for each year in the sample (coefficients unreported). The sample is composed of 942 no-load US 
equity mutual funds appearing in the CRSP database between 1980 and 2006, where we exclude index funds, multiple share classes, funds closed to 
investors, funds of funds and funds with TNA < 10M$ for their entire existence. For regressions where the dependent variable is 1-factor or 4-factor alpha, 
we require funds to have at least 2 years of full return history, which further restricts the sample to 865 funds.  Standard errors are clustered by funds. P-
values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. We report below each triplet of rank 
variables the difference between the coefficient of the top quintile rank variable and that of the corresponding bottom quintile rank variable and the p-value 
resulting from a one-sided t-test of the sign of that difference predicted by the theory. 
 
Performance measured by: Excess returns 1-factor alpha 4-factor alpha 
 
 
Size 33.779 (***) 19.770 (**) 19.374 (**)
 (0.003) (0.044) (0.046)  
Age - 5.182 (***) -4.041 (***) - 4.292 (***)
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  
Expenses -11.064 -1.833 - 7.467  
 (0.255) (0.850) (0.434)  
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
 
(a1) :  151.216 (**) 428.668 (***)  435.206 (***)1 , 1t i t− −
 (0.023) (0.002)  (0.008)  
*Performance δ +
*Performance δ −
*
1*( )* i tPerformance AFLOW δ +
*
1*( )* i trmance AFLOW δ −
**( )Perf e σ δ +
**( )*Performance σ δ −
 
(a2) :   416.654 (***) 371.123 (***)  511.960 (***) 1 , 1t i t− −
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  
 
 a1-a2   -265.44   57.545   -76.754  
   (0.994)   (0.376)   (0.651)  
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  
(a3) :    370.787 (***) 533.282 (**) 1067.626 (**)1 ,t t− −
 (0.007) (0.020) (0.024)  
 
(a4) :    -79.275  23.998 -92.023  1 ,t t− −
 (0.423) (0.860) (0.555)  
Perfo
  
 a3-a4 450.06 (**) 509.28 (*) 1159.6 (**)  
  (0.017)  (0.068)  (0.025)  
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
 
(a5) :   80.485 8.010  210.413   1 , 1 , 1t M t i t− − −
 (0.419) (0.960)  (0.310)  
*ormanc
 
(a6) :   -242.485 (***) -184.306 (***)  -268.217 (***) 1 , 1 , 1t M t i t− − −
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  
    
Table VI: Flow-Performance Relationship: the relative performance case - Restricted sub-sample to years with small fluctuations of economic activity  
This table examines the evolution over the business cycle of the impact of relative fund performance (i.e. Rank) in year t-1 on the net flow of the fund in year t. For each regression, the dependent variable, 
,i tFLOW  is defined as: , 1(1 ), , ,i t i t i t i tFLOW TNA r TNA= − + , where  represents the total net assets of fund i at the end of year t (in M$) and where r− ,i tTNA i,t is the net return of fund i during year t. Each year, funds 
are ranked between 0 (poorest performer) and 1 (best performer) based on their previous year performance, where performance is either measured by excess return ri,t-1 - rm,t-1 , where rm is the return on the equally 
weighted market portfolio, or by residuals of a CAPM equation (1-factor alpha) or of a Carhart (1997) model (4-factor alpha), where factor loadings have been estimated from 24 monthly observations. The 
variables , 1
TOP
i tRank − ,  , 1
MIDDLE
i tRank − , and , 1
BOTTOM
i tRank − , are defined as , , and  
where 1
, 1 , 1min( ,0.2)
BOTTOM
i t i tRank Rank− −= , 1 , 1 , 1min( ,0.6)MIDDLE BOTTOMi t i t i tRank Rank Rank− − −= − , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1min( ,0.2)TOP BOTTOM MIDDLEi t i t i t i tRank Rank Rank Rank− − − −= − −
,i tRank −  refers to the rank of fund i in year t-1. The variable ( GDP GDPg  -g ) measures deviations in percentage of the US real GDP growth rate from its sample mean. Size and expenses are expressed in 
percentage, where Size is defined by TNAi,t-1 / Σj (TNAj,t-1). Regressions also include one dummy variable for each year in the sample (coefficients unreported).  The sample is composed of 942 no-load US equity 
mutual funds appearing in the CRSP database between 1980 and 2006, where we exclude index funds, multiple share classes, funds closed to investors, funds of funds and funds with TNA < 10M$ for their entire 
existence. For regressions where the dependent variable is 1-factor or 4-factor alpha, we require funds to have at least 2 years of full return history, which further restricts the sample to 865 funds. Finally, we 
restrict the sample to years where ,(  - )g g  is comprised between -2 and 2, which implies to exclude years 1980, 1982, 1984, 1991 and 2001. Standard errors are clustered by funds. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. We report below each triplet of rank variables the difference between the coefficient of the top quintile rank variable 
and that of the corresponding bottom quintile rank variable and the p-value resulting from a one-sided t-test of the sign of that difference predicted by the theory. 
GDP t GDP
 
Rank based on: Excess returns 1-factor alpha 4-factor alpha 
 
 
Size  47.883 (***) 30.705 (**) 30.745 (**) 
  (0.001) (0.036) (0.036) 
Age  -5.675 (***) -4.459 (***) -4.657 (***) 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Expenses  -11.108 0.886 -6.432 
   (0.259) (0.929) (0.513) 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
(a1) :     232.185 (*) 444.538 (**) 368.487 , 1
TOP
i tRank −
  (0.098) (0.046) (0.121) 
 
(a2) :   , 1
MIDDLE
i tRank −   182.383 (***) 195.274 (***) 155.446 (***) 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(a3) :   , 1
BOTTOM
i tRank −    -79.747 -61.374 -50.336 
  (0.335) (0.569) (0.605) 
 
 a1-a3  311.93 (**)   505.91 (**)   419.02 (**) 
  (0.018)   (0.013)   (0.046) 
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
(a4) :   , , 1(  - )*
TOP
GDP t GDP i tg g Rank −  513.047 (**) 788.243 (*)  602.212  
 (0.038) (0.064) (0.187)  
 
(a5) :   , , 1(  - )*
MIDDLE
GDP t GDP i tg g Rank −  57.781 (**) 71.764  76.558 (*)  
 (0.048) (0.118) (0.087)  
 
(a6) :   , , 1(  - )*
BOTTOM
GDP t GDP i tg g Rank −   -100.092 - 75.357 -63.966  
 (0.259) (0.556) (0.612)  
  
 a4-a6 613.14 (***)   863.6 (**)  666.18 (*)   
 (0.010)   (0.024)  (0.067)  
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Table VII: Flow-Performance Relationship: the absolute performance case - Restricted sub-sample to years with small fluctuations of economic activity 
 
This table examines the evolution over the business cycle of the impact of absolute fund performance in year t-1 on the net flow of the fund in year t. For each regression, the dependent variable, ,i tFLOW  is 
defined as: 
 ,  , , , 1(1 )i t i t i t i tFLOW TNA r TNA −= − +
where  represents the total net assets of fund i at the end of year t (in M$) and where r,i tTNA i,t is the net return of fund i during year t. Performance is measured either by excess return ri,t-1 - rm,t-1 , where rm is the 
return on the equally weighted market portfolio, or by residuals of a CAPM equation (1-factor alpha) or of a Carhart (1997) model (4-factor alpha), where factor loadings have been estimated from 24 monthly 
observations. δ- (resp. δ+) takes value 1 if the past year performance of the fund is negative (resp. positive), and takes value 0 otherwise. ,(  - )g g  measures deviations in percentage of the US real GDP 
growth rate from its sample mean. Size and expenses are expressed in percentage, where Size is defined by TNA
GDP t GDP
i,t-1 / Σj (TNAj,t-1). Regressions also include one dummy variable for each year in the sample 
(coefficients unreported).  The sample is composed of 942 no-load US equity mutual funds appearing in the CRSP database between 1980 and 2006, where we exclude index funds, multiple share classes, funds 
closed to investors, funds of funds and funds with TNA < 10M$ for their entire existence. For regressions where the dependent variable is 1-factor or 4-factor alpha, we require funds to have at least 2 years of 
full return history, which further restricts the sample to 865 funds. Finally, we restrict the sample to years where ,(  - )g g  is comprised between -2 and 2, which implies to exclude years 1980, 1982, 
1984, 1991 and 2001. Standard errors are clustered by funds. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. We report below each triplet of 
rank variables the difference between the coefficient of the top quintile rank variable and that of the corresponding bottom quintile rank variable and the p-value resulting from a one-sided t-test of the sign of that 
difference predicted by the theory. 
GDP t GDP
 
Performance measured by: Excess returns 1-factor alpha 4-factor alpha 
 
 
Size 48.461 (***) 29.532 (**)  30.604 (**) 
 (0.000) (0.037) (0.034) 
Age -5.706 (***) -4.311 (***) -4.561 (***) 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Expenses -10.062  -2.111 -6.561 
 (0.313) (0.833) (0.510) 
.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
 
(a1) :  1t   -69.535  239.724 109.278 1 ,*t iPerformance δ +− −
*t iPerformance δ −− −
 (0.598)  (0.124) (0.489) 
 
(a2) :   1t   337.616 (***)  245.187 (***) 417.330 (***) 1 ,
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 a1-a2   -407.15   -5.463   -308.05 
  (0.995)   (0.512)   (0.950) 
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
  
(a3) :  1 , ,   694.346 (***) 953.522 (**) 1838.963 (**)  1t GDP t GDP i t
+− −*(  - )*Performance g g δ
 (0.007) (0.025) (0.029)  
 
(a4) :  1 , ,   59.262 - 7.669 86.796  1*(  - )*t GDP t GDP i tPerformance g g δ −− −
 (0.313) (0.917) (0.385)  
  
 a3-a4  635.08 (**)  961.19 (**)   1752.2 (**)   
   (0.016)      (0.024)   (0.027) 
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Table VIII: Change in Levels of Risk as a Function of Interim Performance: 
Case (i): Relative performance based on excess returns 
 
This table examines the impact of performance during the first six months of a calendar year on the change in risk variable between the first and the last six months of the year. For each regression, the dependent 
variable, is defined as −Δ = − , where RISK, , ,i t i Jul Dec yr t i Jun Jan yr tRISK RISK RISK− i,t is measured either by the standard deviation of excess returns (total risk) expressed in percentage, by the standard 
deviation of the residuals of a 1-factor CAPM regression (idiosyncratic risk) expressed in percentage or by the 1-factor CAPM beta (systematic risk). Each year, funds are ranked between 0 (poorest performer) 
and 1 (best performer) based on their performance during the first six months of the year, where performance is measured by excess return , and where  is the return on the 
equally weighted market portfolio. 
, ,i Jan Jun yr t m Jan Jun yr tr r− −− mr
,(  - )g g  measures deviations in percentage of the US real GDP growth rate from its sample mean. Regressions also include one dummy variable for each year in the 
sample (coefficients unreported).  The sample is composed of 942 no-load US equity mutual funds appearing in the CRSP database between 1980 and 2006, where we exclude index funds, multiple share classes, 
funds closed to investors, funds of funds and funds with TNA < 10M$ for their entire existence. Standard errors are clustered by funds. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
GDP t GDP
 
 
RISK variable: Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk Systematic Risk 
 
Business Cycle Effect: No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
,i Jan Jun yr tRank −  0.295 (***) 0.217 (**) 0.277 (***) 0.129 (*) 0.002 -0.013  
 (0.002) (0.024) (0.000) (0.067) (0.934) (0.634)  
 
, ,*(  - )i Jan Jun yr t GDP t GDPRank g g−   - 0.467 (***)  -0.880 (***)  - 0.070 (***)  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
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Table IX: Change in Levels of Risk as a Function of Interim Performance:  
Case (ii): Relative performance based on 1-factor alpha 
 
This table examines the impact of performance during the first six months of a calendar year on the change in risk variable between the first and the last six months of the year. For each regression, the dependent 
variable, is defined as −Δ = , where RISK, , ,i t i Jul Dec yr t i Jun Jan yr tRISK RISK RISK− − i,t is measured either by the standard deviation of monthly excess returns (total risk) expressed in percentage, by the standard 
deviation of the residuals of a 1-factor CAPM regression (idiosyncratic risk) expressed in percentage or by the 1-factor CAPM beta (systematic risk). Each year, funds are ranked between 0 (poorest performer) 
and 1 (best performer) based on their performance during the first six months of the year, where performance is measured by residuals of a CAPM equation (1-factor alpha) where factor loadings have been 
estimated from 24 monthly observations. ,(  - )  measures deviations in percentage of the US real GDP growth rate from its sample mean. Regressions also include one dummy variable for each year 
in the sample (coefficients unreported).  The sample is composed of 865 no-load US equity mutual funds appearing in the CRSP database with at least 2 years of full return history between 1980 and 2006, where 
we exclude index funds, multiple share classes, funds closed to investors, funds of funds and funds with TNA < 10M$ for their entire existence. Standard errors are clustered by funds. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
GDP t GDPg g
 
 
RISK variable: Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk Systematic Risk 
 
Business Cycle Effect: No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
,i Jan Jun yr tRank −  -0.167 (*) -0.289 (***) 0.338 (***) 0.153 (*) -0.301 (***) -0.316 (***)  
 (0.075) (0.003) (0.000) (0.068) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
, ,*(  - )i Jan Jun yr t GDP t GDPRank g g−   - 0.623 (***)  -0.948 (***)  - 0.032 (*)  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.080)  
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Table X: Change in Levels of Risk as a Function of Interim Performance:  
Case (iii): Relative performance based on 4-factor alpha 
 
This table examines the impact of performance during the first six months of a calendar year on the change in risk variable between the first and the last six months of the year. For each regression, the dependent 
variable, is defined as − , where RISK, , ,i t i Jul Dec yr t i Jun Jan yr tRISK RISK RISK−Δ = − i,t is measured either by the standard deviation of monthly excess returns (total risk) expressed in percentage, by the standard 
deviation of the residuals of a 1-factor CAPM regression (idiosyncratic risk) expressed in percentage or by the 1-factor CAPM beta (systematic risk). Each year, funds are ranked between 0 (poorest performer) 
and 1 (best performer) based on their performance during the first six months of the year, where performance is measured by residuals of a Carhart (1997) model (4-factor alpha), where factor loadings have been 
estimated from 24 monthly observations. ,(  - )g g  measures deviations in percentage of the US real GDP growth rate from its sample mean. Regressions also include one dummy variable for each year 
in the sample (coefficients unreported).  The sample is composed of 865 no-load US equity mutual funds appearing in the CRSP database with at least 2 years of full return history between 1980 and 2006, where 
we exclude index funds, multiple share classes, funds closed to investors, funds of funds and funds with TNA < 10M$ for their entire existence. Standard errors are clustered by funds. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
GDP t GDP
 
 
RISK variable: Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk Systematic Risk 
 
Business Cycle Effect: No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
,i Jan Jun yr tRank −  -0.369 (***) -0.408 (***) 0.151 (**) 0.008 -0.232 (***) -0.223 (***)  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.917) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
, ,*(  - )i Jan Jun yr t GDP t GDPRank g g−   -0.202 (**)  -0.731 (***)  0.045 (**)  
  (0.041)  (0.000)  (0.017)  
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Table XI: Change in Levels of Risk as a Function of Interim Performance:  
Case (iv): Absolute performance based on excess returns 
 
This table examines the impact of performance during the first six months of a calendar year on the change in risk variable between the first and the last six months of the year. For each regression, the dependent 
variable, is defined as −Δ = , where RISK, , ,i t i Jul Dec yr t i Jun Jan yr tRISK RISK RISK− − i,t is measured either by the standard deviation of monthly excess returns (total risk) expressed in percentage, by the standard 
deviation of the residuals of a 1-factor CAPM regression (idiosyncratic risk) expressed in percentage or by the 1-factor CAPM beta (systematic risk). Performance is measured by excess return 
, where r, ,i Jan Jun yr t m Jan Jun yr tr r− −− m is the return on the equally weighted market portfolio. ,(  - )  measures deviations in percentage of the US real GDP growth rate from its sample mean. 
Regressions also include one dummy variable for each year in the sample (coefficients unreported).  The sample is composed of 942 no-load US equity mutual funds appearing in the CRSP database between 
1980 and 2006, where we exclude index funds, multiple share classes, funds closed to investors, funds of funds and funds with TNA < 10M$ for their entire existence. Standard errors are clustered by funds. P-
values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
GDP t GDPg g
 
 
RISK variable: Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk Systematic Risk 
 
Business Cycle Effect: No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
,i Jan Jun yr tPerformance −  0.060 -0.929 0.772 -1.168 0.003 -0.122  
 (0.945) (0.357) (0.256) (0.102) (0.979) (0.376)  
 
, ,*(  - )i Jan Jun yr t GDP t GDPPerformance g g−   - 2.043 (***)  -4.006 (***)  - 0.259 (***)  
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.003)  
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Table XII: Change in Levels of Risk as a Function of Interim Performance:  
Case (v): Absolute performance based on 1-factor alpha 
 
This table examines the impact of performance during the first six months of a calendar year on the change in risk variable between the first and the last six months of the year. For each regression, the dependent 
variable, is defined as −Δ = , where RISK, , ,i t i Jul Dec yr t i Jun Jan yr tRISK RISK RISK− − i,t is measured either by the standard deviation of monthly excess returns (total risk) expressed in percentage, by the standard 
deviation of the residuals of a 1-factor CAPM regression (idiosyncratic risk) expressed in percentage or by the 1-factor CAPM beta (systematic risk). Performance is measured by residuals of a CAPM equation 
(1-factor alpha) where factor loadings have been estimated from 24 monthly observations. ,(  - )  measures deviations in percentage of the US real GDP growth rate from its sample mean. Regressions 
also include one dummy variable for each year in the sample (coefficients unreported).  The sample is composed of 865 no-load US equity mutual funds appearing in the CRSP database with at least 2 years of 
full return history between 1980 and 2006, where we exclude index funds, multiple share classes, funds closed to investors, funds of funds and funds with TNA < 10M$ for their entire existence. Standard errors 
are clustered by funds. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
GDP t GDPg g
 
 
RISK variable: Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk Systematic Risk 
 
Business Cycle Effect: No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
,i Jan Jun yr tPerformance −  0.562 -2.147 (***) 3.703 (***) 0.039 -1.119 (***) -1.701 (***)  
 (0.285) (0.001) (0.000) (0.944) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
, ,*(  - )i Jan Jun yr t GDP t GDPPerformance g g−   - 3.077 (***)  -4.162 (***)  - 0.596 (***)  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
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Table XIII: Change in Levels of Risk as a Function of Interim Performance:  
Case (vi): Absolute performance based on 4-factor alpha 
 
This table examines the impact of performance during the first six months of a calendar year on the change in risk variable between the first and the last six months of the year. For each regression, the dependent 
variable, is defined as − , where RISK, , ,i t i Jul Dec yr t i Jun Jan yr tRISK RISK RISK−Δ = − i,t is measured either by the standard deviation of monthly excess returns (total risk) expressed in percentage, by the standard 
deviation of the residuals of a 1-factor CAPM regression (idiosyncratic risk) expressed in percentage or by the 1-factor CAPM beta (systematic risk). Performance is measured by residuals of a Carhart (1997) 
model (4-factor alpha), where factor loadings have been estimated from 24 monthly observations. ,(  - )g g  measures deviations in percentage of the US real GDP growth rate from its sample mean. 
Regressions also include one dummy variable for each year in the sample (coefficients unreported).  The sample is composed of 865 no-load US equity mutual funds appearing in the CRSP database with at least 
2 years of full return history between 1980 and 2006, where we exclude index funds, multiple share classes, funds closed to investors, funds of funds and funds with TNA < 10M$ for their entire existence. 
Standard errors are clustered by funds. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
GDP t GDP
 
 
RISK variable: Total Risk Idiosyncratic Risk Systematic Risk 
 
Business Cycle Effect: No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
,i Jan Jun yr tPerformance −  -1.255 (*) -1.790 (**) 1.994 (***) 0.189 -1.114 (***) -1.070 (***)  
 (0.091) (0.025) (0.007) (0.757) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
, ,*(  - )i Jan Jun yr t GDP t GDPPerformance g g−   - 1.278 (**)  -4.310 (***)  0.1015 
  (0.036)  (0.000)  (0.376)  
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